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Crisis, Stimulus Package and Migration  
in China 
Maria Csanádi - Nie Zihan - Li Shi 
 
Abstract 
 
Authors of this paper trace the influence of the 2008 global crisis and the impact of the 
subsequently implemented stimulus package on the characteristics of migrant flow in China 
until 2012. They analyze the consequences of the temporary but dramatic economic set-back 
on migrant employment and that of the booming investments incited by the stimulus 
package. The paper reveals that the set-back caused dramatic temporary rise of migrant 
unemployment; it also had regional character due to the coastal concentration of exports hit 
by the crisis, determining earlier the direction of migrant flow. Regional priorities of the 
stimulus package reinforced the redirection of migrants away from the coast towards central 
and western regions. Migration routes also shortened partly because migrants’s destination 
shifted closer to their home-town region and also by increasingly finding workplace within 
their own province during the researched period. The stimulus package restructured 
migrant routes of the pre-crisis period not only according to its regional priorities, but also 
according to sectoral priorities from manufacturing towards the construction sector. The 
restructuring, combined with increased number of migrants, shows both temporary and 
steady features as migrants adapt to the dynamics of the impact of the stimulus package and 
to respective economic reactions. 
 
Keywords: migration, employment, stimulus package, crisis, spacial disparities, China 
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Válság, élénkítő csomag és migráció Kínában 
 
Csanádi Mária - Nie Zihan - Li Shi 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
E cikk szerzői nyomon követik a 2008-as globális válság, és az azt követő élénkítő csomag 
hatását Kína belső migrációs folyamatára 2012-ig. A cikk feltárja, hogy a gazdasági 
visszaesés drámai átmeneti hatással volt a migráns munkanélküliségre. A válság nem csak 
összhatásában, hanem regionális eloszlásában is jellegzetes volt a válság által érintett export 
partmenti koncentrációja következtében, amely meghatározta az addigi migráció irányát.  
Az élénkítő csomag térbeli prioritásai felerősítették a válság okozta eláramlást a partmenti 
területekről a közép és nyugati területek felé. Az áramlási utak ezáltal le is rövidültek a 
vizsgált időszakban: a migránsok részben közelebb kerültek eredeti lakhelyük térségéhez, s 
azon belül növekvő mértékben saját tartományukon belül mozogtak. A prioritások nemcsak 
térben változtatták meg az addigi áramlási irányokat, hanem ágazatok szerint is: a 
feldolgozóiparból az építőiparba. Az áramlási irányok dinamikájában tartós és ideiglenes 
vonásokat is felfedezhettünk, ahogy a migránsok alkalmazkodtak az élénkítő csomag 
prioritásai és azok okozta reakciók hatásához.  
 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: migráció, foglalkoztatás, élénkítő csomag, válság, térbeli egyenlőtlenségek, 
Kína 
 
 
JEL kódok: E24, R23, P23, F5, R2, J08 
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Ezt a kutatást az Országos Tudományos Kutatási Alap finanszírozta. Külön köszönet jár 
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NATIONAL LEVEL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS AND THE STIMULUS 
PACKAGE 
The global economic crisis in 2008 had a sweeping effect on the Chinese economy. Major 
economic indicators (Table 1) reflect the set-back caused by the crisis in 2009 both in export, 
in GDP/cap and export/GDP, starting rebound only in 2010. Investments followed the 
opposite tendency: increasing radically during the crisis and slowing down in 2010 when 
economic revival started.  
Table 1.  
Factors influenced by the crisis and the stimulus package 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
GDP y/y 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 
Export y/y 26.0 17.2 -16.0 31.3 20.3 
Export/GDP  35.2 32.0 24.1 25.7 26.1 
Investm y/y 24.8 25.9 30.0 23.8 12.0 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks; GDP (Index of Gross Domestic Product): China Statistical 
Yearbook 2012, Table 2-4; Export (USD): China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 6-3; Export/GDP: 
own calculations based on GDP (yuan; CSY 2012, Table 2-1), export (USD; CSY 2012, Table 6-3; and 
Reference exchange rate of Renminbi to US Dollars (CSY 2012, Table 6-2); Investment (Total 
investment in fixed assets, RMB): China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 5-7 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
Behind this investment trend sectoral differences may be perceived (Table 2): 
investments in manufacturing and construction show opposite prospect of growth from 2008 
to 2009. Investments in manufacturing first slowed down from 2007 onwards, than in 2010 
the pace slightly accelerated and substantially slowed-down again in 2011. Meanwhile, 
investments in construction, though with slower pace than manufacturing, steadily speeded 
up until 2010, leaving the pace of manufacturing well behind, and than slowed down in 2011, 
almost to the pace of investments in manufacturing. More extreme pulsation is detected in 
the annual growth of loans with the radical, almost hundred percent, growth in 2009, 
stagnation in 2010 and shrinkage in 2011. Hectic changes follow the concerns of central 
economic policy.  
The dynamics of FDI still grows in 2008 despite the global crisis events but 
accommodates to the falling export dynamics in 2009. FDI’s radical drop in 2009 happened 
when investment in fixed assets otherwise radically grew. From 2010 on it paralleled the 
acceleration and slow down of overall and sectoral (manufacturing and construction) 
investments.  
 6 
Table 2.  
Factors of development 
 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  
Inv.manuf y/y 30.6 27.4 24.5 25.5 15.9  
Inv.constr y/y 15.7 19.5 28.1 40.6 19.8  
Loans  y/y 39.7 17.0 99.3 0.8 -8.5  
FDI y/y 18.6 23.6 -2.6 17.4 9.7  
 
Source: inv. manuf, inv. constr (RMB): China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 5-7; loans (RMB): 
“Social Financing” from China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 19-11; FDI (Foreign Direct Investment 
Actually Utilized, USD): China Statistical Yearbook 2008, Table 17-15; 2009, Table 17-15; 2010, Table 
6-14; 2011, Table 6-14; 2012, Table 6-14 
China Statistical Yearbooks, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
Radical growth of investment in construction and in loans in 2009 are the result of the 
priorities of the 4 trillion CNY (612.06 billion USD) stimulus package introduced by the 
central government in late 2008. The package constituted 13 percent of the GDP in 2008. 
The goal of the package was to decrease export dependency and stimulate economic growth. 
Therefore, investments were oriented towards domestic fields instead of export, focused on 
the development of infrastructure rather than on overwhelmingly export-oriented 
manufacturing sector, prioritizing large scale enterprises as opposed to small- and middle 
sized enterprises dominating export industries; state owned enterprises were supposed to be 
in better position for resource acquisition and instead of the exporting and economically 
developped coastal region the central and western regions were to be further developped. 
Priority goals of the planned distribution of resources focused mainly on public infrastructure 
(38 percent), post-quake reconstruction (25 percent), social welfare investments (10 
percent), rural development (9 percent), technology advancement (9 percent), sustainable 
development (9 percent) and educational-cultural projects (4 percent). One-third of the 
investments were to be financed by the central budget, the remaining two thirds by local 
governments, enterprises and banks.1  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Source: Economic Observer On-line China's Stimulus Package: A Breakdown of Spending 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance_investment/2009/03/07/131626.shtml 
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REGIONAL LEVEL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS AND THE STIMULUS 
PACKAGE 
The crisis and the stimulus package together changed the shape of the regional development 
trends by 2010. Map 1/a and 1/b display the dramatic regional impact of the crisis in the form 
of distribution of Export/GDP growth before and after the crisis periods. They reveal a 
drastic shift from overall high growth and acceleration of Export/GDP during 2005-2007, 
into a deep set-back in 2008-2010. Some coastal provinces experienced slow-down already in 
the first period. Map 1/b, however, also demonstrates a gradual recuperation through the 
overall acceleration of Export/GDP growth after 2009 both in the east and west. Growth 
during the stimulus period may be detected only in some inland provinces, otherwise all 
others performed below the 2008 year’s share. 
Map 1/a      Map 1/b 
Spatial dynamics of Export/GDP by  
provinces between 2005-2007 
Spatial dynamics of Export/GDP by 
provinces between 2008-2010 
  
 
 
Source: Michigan University, China Data Center chinadataonline.org 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for Export/GDP. Little circles withinprovinces are 
signs of acceleration in growth-rate after 2006 and 2009   
 
Map 2/a and 2/b show the regional redistribution and expansion of investment growth  
towards the central and western regions, to the detriment of the coastal ones. However, it is 
also clear that invesment growth towards those regions only reinforced the tendency of the 
pre-crisis period incited by central economic policy that started in 2004-2006. However, 
growth was overall, since even the lowest pace at the coastal provinces in 2008-2010 involves 
high investment growth and acceleration after 2009 during the period. 
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Map 2/a Map 2/b 
Spatial dynamics of investments in fixed 
assets by provinces between 2005-2007 
Spatial dynamics of investments in fixed 
assets by provinces between 2008-2010 
  
 
Source: Michigan University, China Data Center chinadataonline.org 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for investments in fixed assets. Little circles within 
provinces are signs of acceleration in growth-rate after 2006 and 2009   
 
Map 3/a suggests that FDI also became interested in central and western regions already 
prior the stimulus pakcage and grew fast all over the region and accelerated in many 
provinces from 2006 onwards. What Map 3/b reflects is that growth shifted away from 
formerly preferred coastal and western provinces and was focussed on the central provinces. 
After the crisis period the growth of all coastal provinces slipped into the two lowest growth 
rate intervals from that of the higher and highest ones of before crisis.  
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Map 3/a Map 3/b 
Spatial dynamics of FDI by provinces 
between 2005-2007 
Spatial dynamics of FDI by provinces 
between 2008-2010 
 
 
Source: Michigan University, China Data Center chinadataonline.org 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for FDI. Little circles within provinces are signs of 
acceleration in growth rate after 2006 and 2009   
 
According to Table 2 loans have exploded in 2009 and this had a dramatic regional 
impact. On Map 4/b radical regional changes may be perceived in the regional distribution of 
loan growth in 2008-2010 compared to 2005-2007 (Map 4/a), despite wiedespread regional 
acceleration of loan growth during this period. The highest regional level growth during the 
whole period of 2008-2010 surpassed those of the previous period by two intervals. Map 4/b 
shows that while the loan increase had spread almost overall, provinces where the highest 
growth was registered are located at central and western regions.  
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Map 4/a Map 4/b 
Spatial dynamics of loans from financial 
institutions by provinces between 2005-
2007 
Spatial dynamics of loans from financial 
institutions by provinces between 2008-
2010 
  
Source: Michigan University, China Data Center chinadataonline.org 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for FDI. Little circles within provinces are signs of 
acceleration in growth rate after 2006 and 2009   
 
Besides the regional impact of the stimulus package clear regional-sectoral priorities 
emerged. Construction and manufacturing were typical sectors affected by the crisis and the 
regional-sectoral priorities of the stimulus plan. Map 5/a demonstrates that more frequent 
were the highest growth intervals of investment in the construction sector but also that these  
were all concentrated to the western and central areas as opposed to the regional distribution 
of investment dynamics in manufacturing. Still, investments grew substantially also in 
manufacturing during this period even in the lowest intervals. Here too the highest and 
higher investment pace clusters are located at the central and western regions (Map 5/b), 
while acceleration is shown overwhelmingly along central and eastern regions after 2009. All 
these characteristics demonstrate the revival of manufacturing after crisis and enterprises’ 
reaction to direct or indirect investment opportunities provided by the stimulus package 
regionally.  
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Map 5/a 
 
Map 5/b 
Spatial dynamics of investments in 
construction by provinces between 
2008-2010 
Spatial dynamics of investments in 
manufacturing by provinces between  
2008-2010 
 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 5-7; 2010, Table 5-7; 2011, Table 5-7 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for investments in infrastructure and 
manufacturing. Little circles within provinces are signs of acceleration in growth-rate after 2009   
 
 
The investments in the manufacturing and construction sectors and their regional 
concentration incited the production of both prioritized state-owned units and that of the 
private sector through the increased input demand created by the former. Maps 6/a and 6/b 
show that in the case of construction, output growth of state-owned sector was much higher 
and also more concentrated to the central and western regions than in the case of 
manufacturing. Moreover, it also stimulated higher and more regionally concentrated output 
growth in the private field.  
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Map 6/a 
 
Map 6/b 
Expansion of output in the state-owned 
field in construction sector in 2009 
Expansion of output in the activated 
private sphere in construction sector in 
2009 
  
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 14-16; 2010, Table 15-16; 2011, Table 5-6 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for network and market fields in construction and 
manufacturing.  
 
However, we know from Table 2 that manufacturing sector followed the increase in 
construction by 2010 though at slower pace. This  is reflected regionally both in the output 
growth  of state-owned fields in central and coastal regions (Map 7/a) and the widespread 
expansion of the output growth of the market field in the central and western regions (Map 
7/b), though growth pace intervals in manufacturing output were lower than in the case of 
construction in both state-owned and private fields.  
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Map 7/a Map 7/b 
Expansion of output in the state-owned 
field in manufacturing sector in 2009 
Expansion of output in the activated 
private sphere in manufacturing sector 
in 2009 
  
 
Source: State-owned: China Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 13-8; 2010, Table 14-8; Private: China 
Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 13-12; 2010, Table 14-12 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
Note: The colors show the different speed of growth for investments in infrastructure and 
manufacturing. Little circles within provinces are signs of acceleration in growth-rate after 2009   
 
Concluding the above, maps suggest the realization of both regional, sectoral and 
ownership priorities of the stimulus package compared to pre-crisis period in the 
development towards central and western regions, towards construction and the state sector. 
However, they also demonstrate the prompt reaction of the manufacturing sector in central 
and western regions and that of the market to the input demands of the prioritized economic 
sectors. Regional distribution of accelerations after 2009 show the gradual regeneration of 
the coastal region regarding export/GDP, investment and output, suggesting temporal factors 
in the stimulus package and also its indirect stimulating impact combined with the slow rise 
of export.  Next we shall first analyze the impact of the crisis and the stimulus package on 
employment in general. Second, we shall reveal to what extent migration was more or less 
sensitive to these phenomena, and what consequences did this bring about. 
 IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND THE STIMULUS PACKAGE ON EMPLOYMENT  
To what extent was employment influenced by the crisis and by the regional, sectoral and 
ownership priorities of the stimulus package?  On national level, overall employment data in 
urban areas (Table 3) does not reflect the set-back during the crisis suggested on the maps 
and Table 1. On average, employment growth slowed down half percent in 2008 compared to 
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the 2007 growth rate, while it increased continuously by three-four percent each year until 
2011. We have to acknowledge that yearly data do not reveal temporal set-backs. 
Checking data by ownership, the picture is more diverse. Insensitivity to the crisis may be 
perceived at SOEs where dynamics of low growth rate of employment was practically 
stagnant along 2007, 2008 and 2009. Employment in SOEs began to increase from 2010 
onwards presumably as an impact of the stimulus package. Meanwhile, sensitivity to crisis 
was much higher at collectively owned units, cooperatives and in joint ownership enterprises, 
where a continuous but slowing down shrinkage of employment was experienced and no 
indirect impact of the stimulus package is perceived.  The most sensitive reactions may be 
seen in the high growth rate of employment in private enterprises, that slowed down in 2008 
at the start of the crisis, but again accelerated by 2009 at the impact of the stimulus package. 
This dynamics matches the reactions of the market to imput demands of the prioritized fields 
seen on maps (6/b and 7/b).  The high growth in the private sector slowed down again in 
2010 when employment in SOEs already began to grow and both grew in 2011 but growth 
pace was higher and grew much more radically at private enterprises, showing more sensitive 
reactions.  
Table 3.   
Growth Rate of Employed Persons at Year-end in Urban Areas by Ownership 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Urban Employment 4.47 3.72 3.80 4.10 3.54 
State-owned Units -0.10 0.36 -0.42 1.50 2.88 
Collective-owned Units -5.98 -7.80 -6.63 -3.34 0.92 
Cooperative Units -4.33 -3.53 -2.44 -2.56 -4.43 
Joint Ownership -3.57 0.00 -13.72 -1.67 1.42 
Limited Liability 
Corporations 
8.05 5.73 10.91 7.40 25.09 
Share Holding Corporations 
Ltd. 
6.31 6.60 13.85 7.07 15.54 
Private Enterprises 15.85 11.85 8.20 9.50 13.85 
Units with Fund from HK, 
Mac. Taiw. 
11.28 -0.15 6.17 6.76 21.09 
Foreign Funded Units 13.42 4.43 3.70 7.73 15.52 
Self-employed Individuals 9.88 9.03 17.61 5.25 17.00 
 
Source: Compiled from China Statistical Yearbook 2012, Table 4-2 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
Similar reactions are experienced in employment growth in shareholding corporations and 
limited liability corporations, where employment growth rate doubled in 2009. Parallel to 
those, employment in foreign funded units, and at Hong Kong, Makao and Taiwan 
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enterprises increased substantially from 2009 and 2010 respectively, adding up to the 
category of non-state-owned enterprises.  
Can we detect the influence of the crisis and the stimulus package on employment at 
prioritized construction sector? Available data regarding ownership and sectors combined 
are unfortunately more aggregated than in Table 3 allowing for less subtle analysis. However, 
Tables 4/a, b, c, d show that if we combine ownership and sectors the differences become 
more visible. Data testify for the differing sensitivity to the crisis and to the stimulus package 
over the years.2 The most sensitive to crisis were the collectively owned enterprises (Table 
4/a) regardless of sectors with employment loss all over the examined period. Recuperation 
of this sector was only experienced in the prioritized construction and in hotel services, but 
only by 2011.  
Table 4/a.  
Dynamics of employment in collectively owned enterprises in urban  
units by sectors between 2007 and 2011 (previous year =100) 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Manufacturing 
-
10.71 
-9.27 
-
10.07 
-9.49 -7.68 
Construction -1.86 -6.76 -3.27 -1.21 15.90 
Transport, Storage & Post -9.26 -9.92 -7.32 -3.86 -11.55 
Wholesale & Retail 
-
10.89 
-
15.02 
-10.51 -8.63 -2.49 
Hotels & Catering -8.97 -4.70 -5.48 -8.49 4.41 
Leasing & Business Service 0.95 -3.86 10.89 2.47 -15.34 
Services to Households & Other Serv. -9.73 -1.00 -6.36 -4.40 
-
23.54 
Total -5.91 -7.88 -6.60 -3.34 0.93 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2007-2012: Table 5-5 in Yearbook 2007; Table 4-6 in 
Yearbook 2008 and 2009; Table 4-5 in Yearbook 2010 and 2011; Table 4-4 in 
Yearbook 2012. 
 
Crisis is reflected also in all sectors in the employment data of state owned enterprises in 
2008-2009 (Table 4/b), while the impact of the stimulus package priorities emerges in 2010-
2011 but only in the prioritized construction sector that might have compensated all others. 
                                                        
2 Table 4 a, b, c, d is a combined dataset compiled from two tables in the NBS statistics that contain 
only urban employment data. One is the "Number of Employed Persons in Urban Units at Year-end by 
Status of Registration and Sector in Detail". This table contains SOE-s, collective units and „other type 
of ownership that  does not include private ownership; The other table iss the “Number of Engaged 
Persons in Urban Private Enterprises and Self-employed Individuals”. Combination of this two tables 
is possible since both contain urban units,  sectoral divisions and ownership but these latter do not 
overlap. 
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By 2011 all other sectors show growth in the number of employed, except for the state owned 
manufacturing where the shrinkage of employment was steady throughout the period, while 
in the leasing service sector ups and downs are experienced between 2007-2011.3  
 
Table 4/b.  
Dynamics of employment in state owned enterprises in urban units  
by sectors between 2007 and 2011 (previous year =100)  
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Manufacturing -6.48 -6.29 -9.82 -4.87 -4.49 
Construction 3.21 -1.31 -1.89 6.12 19.53 
Transport, Storage & Post -0.24 -1.73 -2.49 -2.56 3.12 
Wholesale & Retail -6.78 -7.66 -0.28 -4.82 6.17 
Hotels & Catering -8.27 -3.30 -2.60 -0.98 3.10 
Leasing & Business Service -0.47 4.51 -0.39 4.85 -2.77 
Services to Households & Other Serv. 3.69 0.11 -1.66 2.02 6.48 
Total -0.11 0.37 -0.42 1.50 2.88 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 
2007-2012: Table 5-5 in Yearbook 2007; Table 4-6 in Yearbook 2008 and 2009; Table 4-5 in 
Yearbook 2010 and 2011; Table 4-4 in Yearbook 2012. 
 
Interestingly enough growth was continuous at “other type of ownership” (Table 4/c) that 
does not contain SOEs, collective and private units and self-employed individuals. This was 
experienced in all sectors in this category throughout the whole examined period. Thus, 
neither crisis, nor stimulus package impact is distinguishable. The highest growth rate in 
employment over the whole period among all sectors and in 2011 among all ownership types 
was in the construction industry. Manufacturing also showed faster growth of employment in 
2011 but some service sectors proved to be faster.  
                                                        
3 Calculations are based on 7 sectors that were available in this combination of ownership and sector. 
However, this may contain distortions regarding ownership, since the 7 sectors selected are very 
typical sectors for private enterprises and self-employed individuals. The sum of them takes up about 
90% of the Total. However, for state-owned and collective owned enterprises, the 7 sectors are 
probably not representative enough. 
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Table 4/c.   
Dynamics of employment in other types of ownership in urban  
units by sectors between 2007 and 2011 (previous year =100)  
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Manufacturing 6.61 0.67 4.38 6.22 15.56 
Construction 10.56 6.29 18.17 10.11 45.60 
Transport, Storage & Post 9.08 8.48 10.69 4.08 10.28 
Wholesale & Retail 4.86 11.83 9.89 7.94 30.05 
Hotels & Catering 7.76 8.58 8.72 6.24 21.65 
Leasing & Business Service 13.15 25.30 10.97 9.80 -9.98 
Services to Households & Other Serv. 4.01 -4.04 17.52 5.45 -1.77 
Total 8.04 4.12 8.87 7.28 19.68 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2007-2012: Table 5-5 in Yearbook 2007; Table 4-6 in 
Yearbook 2008 and 2009; Table 4-5 in Yearbook 2010 and 2011; Table 4-4 in Yearbook 
2012. 
 
At private enterprises (Table 4/d) crisis was perceivable only in the slow-down of growth 
in 2008 and 2009 in manufacturing and in 2008 in transporting sectors, but here too, the 
pace of revival was fast. Employment in construction sector grew the fastest in 2008 and 
from then on growth pace, though high, did not reach that percentage. High pace in 
construction in private fields match Map 6/b, however those in service and commerce sectors 
were higher. Except for transport and storage, the lowest pace is revealed in the 
manufacturing sector, which is also true in the case of state owned enterprises where 
employment shrank throughout the whole period (Table 4/b). These trends do not reflect the 
picture revealed on Map 7/b that shows prompt reaction  in the output of private 
manufacturing enterprises to the regional and sectoral priorities of the stimulus package 
unless increased output in the manufacturing sector was achieved by growing productivity.    
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Table 4/d.  
Dynamics of engaged persons in urban private enterprises and self-employed 
individuals by sectors between 2007 and 2011 (previous year =100)  
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Manufacturing 12.50 8.48 4.39 8.41 6.51 
Construction 17.24 19.47 11.87 15.27 13.86 
Transport, Storage & Post 11.35 4.61 9.00 0.11 7.98 
Wholesale & Retail 12.21 11.05 15.30 4.87 20.90 
Hotels & Catering 9.26 9.94 12.61 6.34 10.58 
Leasing & Business Service 17.45 14.18 19.96 8.93 23.55 
Services to Households & Other Serv. 9.19 10.07 13.82 12.96 9.73 
Total 13.26 10.68 12.09 7.66 15.19 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
NBS, China Statistical Yearbook 2007-2012: Table 5-12 in Yearbook 2007; Table 4-13 in Yearbook 
2008; Table 4-12 in Yearbook 2009; Table 4-8 in Yearbook 2010 and 2011; Table 4-7 in Yearbook 
2012 
 
If we try to reveal whether regional focus of the crisis and the differing regional priorities 
of the stimulus package have influenced employment distribution, we meet further 
constrained chances for analysis. Data on regional-sectoral employment differences are only 
available for private enterprises that definitely distorts results (Table 5). Regional 
distribution of employment in private enterprises show the gradual and slight decline of the 
share of the east to the advantage of the central regions, while the share of the western region 
remained stagnant. In this respect, original goal of the stimulus package to deviate the 
production from export orientation focused to the east and develop central and western 
regions did not bring about radical change regarding employment ratios, despite its strong 
regional investment focus depicted on maps. 
Table 5.  
Regional share of Engaged Persons in Urban Private Enterprises 
 and Self-employed Individuals 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
East 57.58 57.48 58.10 55.79 54.35 
Center  21.95 21.68 22.04 24.26 24.96 
West 20.48 20.84 19.86 19.95 20.68 
 
Source: own calculations based on China Statistical Yearbook 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/, NBS, China Statistical 
Yearbooks, 2008-2012: Table 4-13 in Yearbook 2008; Table 4-12 in Yearbook 2009; Table 4-8 
in Yearbook 2010 and 2011; Table 4-7 in Yearbook 2012 
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When we disaggregate these data by sector and regions both the impact of the crisis and 
that of the stimulus package may be better tracked. In the east, all sectors follow the general 
tendency of the east loosing faintly its dominant position, except for transport and storage 
where the share of the eastern region increased to the detriment of the central and western 
regions. Losses however are different sector by sector. (Table 6).  
Table 6.  
Regional share of Engaged Persons in Urban Private Enterprises and Self-
employed Individuals according to sectors (%) 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
E C W E C W E C W E C W 
Manuf.. 70.38 16.42 13.20 70.26 16.98 12.76 69.13 16.98 13.88 68.85 18.41 12.75 
Constr.n 65.00 15.69 19.31 63.38 15.85 20.77 59.73 20.11 20.17 59.02 20.35 20.63 
Transp. Stor 53.66 24.34 22.00 57.48 21.92 20.60 56.02 22.65 21.33 55.93 23.06 21.01 
Wholes& Ret. 52.87 24.15 22.98 55.18 23.94 20.88 51.52 27.27 21.20 49.29 28.11 22.60 
Hotels & Cat. 44.12 25.90 29.98 46.34 26.13 27.53 43.71 29.00 27.29 42.39 28.31 29.30 
Leasing & Bus. 61.01 21.03 17.97 60.69 20.84 18.47 59.91 21.72 18.36 59.30 22.45 18.25 
Serv. to Househ. 50.23 25.88 23.88 48.58 28.51 22.91 44.64 33.45 21.91 44.62 31.59 23.79 
Total 57.48 21.68 20.84 58.10 22.04 19.86 55.79 24.26 19.95 54.35 24.96 20.68 
 
Note: E= Eastern region; C= central region; W= wester region 
Source: own calculations based on own calculations based on China Statistical Yearbook  
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/, NBS, China Statistical Yearbooks, 2009-
2012: Table 4-12 in Yearbook 2009; Table 4-8 in Yearbook 2010 and 2011; Table 4-7 in 2012 
Yearbook. 
 
In manufacturing, regional trends show insensitivity in the distribution of employment in 
private enterprises, despite the fact that major crisis impact was exerted on this export 
sensitive sector concentrated to the east and to the private field (see Map 3/b and map 7/b). 
The ratio of employment in this sector in the east was considerably higher than the average 
throughout the years. This picture becomes more subtle if we consider the previous tables 
(Table 4/c and 4/d). These tables show that though regional distribution of employment with 
the overwhelming share of the east practically stagnated, the growth of employed at private 
and other type of enterprises in manufacturing show substantive slow-down during the crisis 
period of 2008-2009.  
Major changes in regional distribution may be traced in service sectors (whole-sale and 
retail, hotel and catering), where higher ratio of the eastern region continuously declined to 
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the advantage of the central region, or both to central and western regions owing to the faster 
increase in the number of employed persons in these latter regions4.  
The regional ratio of employment in construction was the second highest in the east after 
that of manufacturing, though its importance compared in absolute employment numbers 
was much lower. This high ratio however, steadily decreases over the years to the advantage 
of the central region. Decline of the ratio occurs despite its continuous growth in absolute 
value, matching the regional and sectoral priorities of the stimulus package also in private 
sector’s employment. However, Table 3 shows that except for 2008-2009, construction 
sector had the highest growth rate between 2007-2010 in overall employment no matter 
which ownership is considered.  
Concluding the above, employment dynamics by ownership and sectors do show 
stronger differences by ownership than sectors regarding the sensitivity to crisis. However, 
differences in sectoral dynamics proved to be more sensitive to the stimulus package than to 
ownership priorities. The pace of employment in the prioritized construction sector grew 
without regard on the ownership, while that in manufacturing declined. Ownership instead, 
influenced the year the pace began to grow and also the scale of the pace.   
Regarding private enterprises, the adaptation of employment to regional priorities in 
general and to sectoral priorities in particular may be detected in  the construction sector 
while insensitivity is shown in the manufacturing sector, keeping earlier regional ratio over 
the years. Regional priorities are more frequently perceived in the central rather than in the 
western regions. 
Would these overall employment characteristics be consistent with migrant flow? We 
suppose that opposite to the low sensitivity of employment to the crisis and to the regional 
and sectoral priorities of the stimulus pakcage we shall find a more flexibly adapting migrant 
labor market. Migrants who are unsettled, without urban household registration (hukou), 
with low ratio of labor contract and insurance and weakly unionized have lower capacity to 
promote their collective interest. Without institutionalized channels of protest, either mass 
demonstrations or frequent mobility are chosen. On the other hand, employers who use 
migrant workers with low interest enforcement capacity are less constrained by legal 
commitments to improve working conditions and to manoeuver according to their actual 
needs. Thus, migrant flow incited from both directions would react much more sensitively to 
economic dynamics caused by the crisis and the priorities of the stimulus package. 
                                                        
4 Unfortunately here we are unable to distinguish enterprises from self-employed. Therefore, it is not 
clear, to what extent this faster growth was due to the increase in the number of enterprises or of self-
employed as a result of increased domestic market at central and western regions or as a consequence 
of unemployment in other sectors. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON MIGRANT FLOW 
 
A national level migrant and nonfarm rural labor survey has been carried out by the Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) each year since 2008. It provides a unique chance to 
reveal and follow the crucial period of the 2008 crisis and the stimulus package from the 
point of view of migration.  
The NBS migrant survey was launched at the end of 2008. It is based on the NBS’s rural 
household survey sample. The survey covers 31 provinces, autonomous regions and 
municipalities, 899 counties, 7500 villages and nearly 200,000 rural laborers. The 
introduction of the specific sampling method can be found in China Statistical Yearbook. 
Each year since 2008, the NBS would publish a report based on this survey. The latest report 
is for 2012. The report is published on the website of the NBS each year and from 2010, it was 
included as a chapter in China Development Report 2011. 
Unfortunately some of the necessary criteria from our point of view as size and ownership 
of enterprises where migrants work are completely missing. Still, several tendencies 
regarding the interdependency between economic developments and migrant flow may be 
revealed. 
As already said, regionally, the economic crisis directly hit overwhelmingly the eastern 
coast of the country where export was concentrated (Map 8). Indirectly, however, it hit also 
those central and western regions, the origin of 80 percent of the migrants (NBS small census 
2005). As a consequence of the crisis, by the end of 2008, 600 thousand enterprises were 
suddenly closed down, most of them in the eastern region (Kong et al. 2009, p. 237)5  and 16 
percent of the 140 million migrants became suddenly unemployed between late 2008 and 
early 2009.6 Migrant lay-off was regionally concentrated, since in 2008, 71 percent of the 
                                                        
5 Close-downs and the severity of impact was different among cities and sectors. In the second year of 
their follow-up migrant survey in early 2009 Meng at al. (2010) unveiled strong disparities among the 
15 cities surveyed for migration. The number of close-down workplaces embraced about one third of 
the referred 600 000 and the percentage of close-downs compared to their original sample workplaces 
ranged from 1.5 percent to 40 percent. The percentage of close-down workplaces was even more 
extreme by sectors and cities. In manufacturing close-downs ranged from zero to 45 percent, in 
construction from zero to 50 percent, in various types of agencies from zero to 60 percent of sampled 
workplaces vanished by early 2009. On average, around 13 percent (1.4 million) of the migrant 
employment in the 15 surveyed cities has been affected by the shutdowns, in the hardest hit cities were 
20-34 percent of the sampled individuals were affected. in the economic downturn (Meng at al, 2010, 
pp. 11-12 
6 Crisis has a multiplicative effect on families’ living and social conditions since rural households 
use migration as one of their main sources of income, with remittances accounting for about 21 per 
cent of total rural income and 43 per cent of migrant-sending households’ total income in 2007 
(Demurger, 2012). Multiplicative is also the effect on sending families’ age and gender distribution 
during crisis owing to returning migrants and also so-far migration routes, since „.. In 2007, 19 per 
cent of sending households had at least one migrant member working in the local county seat, 30 
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migrants were working in the eastern provinces attracted by the export industry and 
surrounding regions, 13.2 percent in central area and 15.4 percent in western area (NBS 
report, 2008).  
Map 8 
Regional distribution of Export/GDP size in 2007  
 
Source:  China’s Statistical Yearbook NBS, 2008 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ 
 
Concentration of migrants in 2008 on the crisis-hit eastern region is reflected by the fact 
that 62.4 of migrants who returned home in late 2008 to their hometown returned from 
eastern provinces,7 16.15 percent from central and 21.3 percent from western provinces. Not 
only regional, but provincial concentration of those who returned was high: 24.6 percent 
returned from Guangdong Province and 17.2 percent from Yangtze River Delta area. These 
two areas were the main destinations of migration. Regional sensitivity owing to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
per cent had at least one migrant member working outside the county within the province, and 44 
per cent had at least one migrant member working outside the province.Sending households 
…have a higher share of adult males.. fewer elderly members …, but more children below the age of 
16.” (Demurger, 2012).  
 
7 Comparing migrant’s regional distribution to the regional distribution of returned migrants, it seems 
that migrants in eastern area were less likely to return, while migrants in western and centlal regions 
were more likely to return. However, these numbers are blurred by the fact that the figures on 
returned migrants were collected around Spring Festival, and many migrants in eastern area faced 
high cost of returning to their hometown in center-west, discouraging their returning during Spring 
Festival. The crisis might have caused a higher return rate in 2008 compared with 2007, but 
unfortunately we do not have such comparable information. 
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concentration of migrants was intensified by the fact that in 2008 about 63 percent of 
migrants were working overwhelmingly in provincial capitals, large cities and municipalities 
(NBS survey, 2008). This ratio remained practically stagnant over the examined years (Table 
7) 
Table 7.  
Concentration of migrants (%) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Four municip. 9.0 8.8 10.3 
Prov.capitals 19.8 19.4 20.5 
Pref. level cities 34.4 34.8 33.9 
Concentration 63.2 63 64.7 
Summa migr. 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: For 2009 data, see 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?channelid=33728&record=21; for 2010 data, see 
China Development Report 2011; and for 2011 data, see 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20120427_402801903.htm.   
 
Crisis impact may be also revealed in the sectoral-regional distribution of returned 
migrants’ earlier workplace: 26.1 percent of returned migrants worked in the export oriented 
manufacturing and 28.2 percent worked in construction (presumably in the east from where 
over 60 percent of returned migrants flew). Among all migrants who worked in 
manufacturing and construction, 46.2 percent and 73.3 percent had returned respectively, a 
higher proportion than the average.8 Sensitivity to the crisis is reflected by the fact that this 
period saw the increase in the frequency and in the number of participants of mass 
demonstrations and the radicalization of requests (Cai Y, 2008, 2010).  
The prevalence and propagation of the crisis was uncertain, so were the chances of 
recovery and its impact on party legitimacy strictly intertwined with the economy (Csanádi, 
2008; Buckley, 2009; Cai and Chan, 2009; Demick, 2008; Chan, 2010; Kong at al, 2009; 
Meng at al, 2010; Wong 2008; Charter 2008; Chen N.; 2009, Yu 2009). However, 
uncertainty soon withered away.  The dramatic set-back proved to be short-lived. From the 
second quarter of 2009 exports began to recover after the dramatic set-back, loans 
skyrocketed and investments accelerated already in 2009 followed by even higher pace of 
investments in the construction sector next year. Although GDP growth was slower compared 
to export growth but it accelerated to 10.4 by 2010 and also FDI got impetus after the 
shrinkage in 2009 (Table 1 and Table 2).  
                                                        
8 Data source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2008, web link:   
http://www.stats.gov.cn/was40/gjtjj_detail.jsp?channelid=33728&record=41 
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Thanks to the prompt implementation of the stimulus package and to the recuperation 
and regional spreading of export activity, migrant unemployment soon dropped to 3.4 
percent after mid 2009 (Cai and Chan, 2009, 521). This is the reason why the 16 percent 
unemployment rate during the few months at the peak of the crisis is not visible in case of 
year-on-year calculations. 
THE IMPACT OF THE STIMULUS PACKAGE ON MIGRANT FLOW 
The stimulus plan not only quickly compensated the impact of the crisis but also kept the 
labor demand and the demand for migrants growing well above their number before the 
crisis (Table 8).  
Table 8.  
Scale of Migrants  and Urban Employment (Million) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Nonfarm Rural 
Labor 
225.42 229.78 242.23 252.78 262.78 
1.  Migrants 140.41 145.33 153.35 158.63 163.36 
Growth rate  3.50 5.52 3.44 2.98 
(1) Migrants 
within households 
111.82 115.67 122.64 125.64 129.61 
(2) Migrate out 
with whole families 
28.59 29.66 30.71 32.79 33.75 
2.  Local Nonfarm 85.01 84.45 88.88 94.15 99.26 
Urban Employed 
Persons 
321.03 333.22 346.87 359.14 371.02 
Growth rate 3.72 3.80 4.10 3.54 3.31 
 
Note: nonfarm rural labor (migrants plus local rural workers). Here migrant stands for rural labor that 
migrates out of their home town and local rural workers stands for those who have jobs within their 
origin township and do not migrate out. 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-2012. 2008 data is obtained from the 2009 
report. Web link for 2012 report: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20130527_402899251.htm All 
following tables concerning China Migrants Monitoring Report 2012 share the same source above. 
NBS, China Statistical Yearbooks 2012, Table 4-2. 
 
During the researched period the estimated number of migrants increased by almost 20 
million: from 140.41 million in 2008 to 158.63 million in 2011.9 The remarkable labor market 
                                                        
9 China’s migrants monitorinig report (NMS) 2012, also in China Development Report 
 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20130527_402899251.htm. Other sources as China-CIA The 
world Factbook (2013) https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html 
estimate the number of migrant growth much larger, to 100 million, but I assume there is a category 
mistake in 2011 that does not overlap that of in 2008. In 2008 it considers migrants amounting to 
140.41 million, while in 2011 considers non-farm rural laborers (migrants plus local rural workers) 
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impact of the stimulus package is reflected in the research report of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). According to the report, investments created 
5.6 million permanent jobs and 50 million temporary workplaces (Blomberg, 2010 June 15)10. 
The pace of migrant growth followed the growing labor demand through the acceleration of 
investment growth in construction and sky-rocketing loans in 2009. The rate of growth in 
migrant number was the highest in 2010, just as the rate of overall employment in urban 
area, though the growth rate of migrants was higher (Table 8).  
THE INFLUENCE OF THE CRISIS AND THE STIMULUS PACKAGE ON 
MIGRANT’S REGIONAL AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION 
The question is: did the crisis, the investment priorities of the stimulus package, the 
adaptation of the private sphere in construction and manufacturing sectors and the growing 
scale of migration, influence the thus-far regional and sectoral distribution of migrants? Was 
there a restructuring of migrant routes within provinces and across provinces by regions? If 
yes, do they seem persistent or temporary?  
Table 9.  
Regional distribution of migrants migrating within and across provinces (%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 
Within 
Prov. 
Across 
Prov. 
Within 
Prov. 
Across 
Prov. 
Within 
Prov. 
Across 
Prov. 
Within 
Prov. 
Across 
Prov. 
Within 
Prov. 
Across 
Prov. 
National 46.7 53.3 48.8 51.2 49.7 50.3 52.9 47.1 53.2 46.8 
Eastern 79.7 20.3 79.6 20.4 80.3 19.7 83.4 16.6 83.7 16.3 
Central 29.0 71.0 30.6 69.4 30.9 69.1 32.8 67.2 33.8 66.2 
Western 37.0 63.0 40.9 59.1 43.1 56.9 43.0 57.0 43.4 56.6 
 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Reports 2009-2012 
 
Table 9 shows a steady decline in the share of those who migrate out of their province. 
The tendency that began with the crisis was reinforced by the impact of the regional 
preferences of the stimulus package. We find a regional restructuring towards migrants who, 
owing to regional economic developments, first were forced, later preferred to find job within 
                                                                                                                                                                             
252.78 million. Here migrant stands for rural labor that migrates out of their home town and local 
rural workers stands for those who have jobs within their origin township and do not migrate out.  
10 China May See `Severe' Job Losses Next Year As Stimulus Unwinds, CICC Says 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-16/china-may-see-severe-job-losses-as-stimulus-
projects-completed-cicc-says.html, 2010 June 15 
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their hukou province11 rather than migrate outside the province. By 2011 the overall ratio 
among those who stayed and those who left the province reversed compared to earlier 
tendencies: the share of those who remained in their hukou province was higher than that of 
those who migrated outside of it. Disaggregating this ratio by regions, regional differences 
may be detected: the majority of those with hukou in the east steadily migrated within their 
own province throughout the researched period.  
Supposedly due to the crisis and the regional investment preferences of the stimulus 
package, the ratio of those who chose to remain within their hukou province increased the 
most in the traditionally major source of outmigration, at western provinces. It slightly but 
steadily increased both at eastern and central regions. This tendency matches the regional 
impact of priority developments seen on all the maps ranging from 1-7 and the growth of 
employment in the prioritized construction sector in all three regions. The differences emerge 
in the years when the ratio of those who remained in their own hukou province increased the 
most: in the west the increase occurred continuously from 2008 throughout 2010, in the 
center in slower pace from 2010 throughout 2012, while in the east, the shortest in time from 
2010 to 2011. The different time and length of growth ratio reasons may be manifold: it might 
be connected to the different periods of investment growth and migrant labor demand in the 
different regions. We do not have related data in this respect.  Whether this restructuring 
within regions remains persistent, we would need to examine a longer period. Despite the 
increase in the number of migrants, and the widespread economic growth around main 
industrial sites migrants’ concentration to large cities did not change, instead, somewhat 
even grew at municipalities and province capitals (Table 8). This is because job opportunities 
brought by the stimulus package benefited mainly large cities, and these latter are the places 
where enterprises concentrate. We do not have however, data on migrant concentration 
according to ownership that would control for the trends of distribution of migrants in cities 
either according to the stimulus priorities or the reaction of the private sector to those. 
As a result of regional developmental preferences and higher ratio of those who remained 
in their own province, in 2009 compared to 2008 central and western regions absorbed 
larger ratio of migrants both in absolute numbers and relatively, though the absorbing 
dominance of the east from other regions prevailed (Table 10). Moreover, in the east, in 
absolute numbers, fewer migrants remained in their own location in 2009 compared to 
2008, also decreasing relatively compared to the remaining migrant population at central 
and western regions. However, from the source aspect, the decline of the share of the eastern 
area happened largely in 2009, at the peak of the crisis and the absolute numbers also 
slumped. Migrants from central and western area increased both in shares and absolute 
                                                        
11 Hukou province means the province where the migrant’s home-town is located and his/her 
registration belongs to. 
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numbers in 2009. The crisis drove migrants from eastern area back to their home town and 
migrants from central and western countryside were attracted to cities nearby since there 
were more job opportunities in central and western cities due to the stimulus plan. If we take 
the absolute numbers behind the percentages in the available 2008-2009 years for migrants 
entering from outside the region in the east, center and west respectively, and first deduct the 
migrant numbers of the two years within a region and second, deduct regional results from 
each other, we can get the regional location of net entrants. Based on that we can argue that 
new entrants in 2009 were concentrated to the central and western regions (99.64- 90.76 = 
8.88E; 24.77-18.59= +6.18C; 29.40-21.65=7.75W. 6.18C+7.75W-8.88E=+5.85 net new 
entrants).  After 2009’s radical restructuring, the share of each region remained quite stable, 
while the number of migrants grew in a modest rate. It looks like that in this respect in these 
early years the crisis had stronger role in the destination of new entrants than the starting 
stimulus package. Naturally the available period is too short to reveal a tendency.  
Table 10.  
Scale and share of migrants from 2008 to 2012 according to original location 
and to destination by region 
 ALL EAST CENTER WEST 
  F T F T F T F T F T F T 
 mil % % mil mil % % mil mil % % mil mil 
2008 140.41 37.6 71.0 52.79 99.64 32.7 13.2 45.91 18.59 29.7 15.4 41.70 21.65 
2009 145.33 31.9 62.5 46.36 90.76 36.5 17.0 53.05 24.77 31.6 20.2 45.92 29.40 
2010 153.35 31.8  48.77  36.6  56.13  31.6  48.46  
2011 158.63 31.6  50.13  36.6  58.06  31.8  50.44  
2012 163.36 31.5  51.46  36.7  59.95  31.8  51.95  
 
Note: F= Coming From; T= going To; All those coming from (F) = 100; all those going to (T) = is nearly 
100 yearly. The rest (e.g. 0.4 in 2008 and 0.3 in 2009) is the share of those oversea migrants. 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-20112 
 
Unfortunately we do not have a clear sectoral distribution of migrants only that of non-
farm rural laborers that to some extent distorts migration figures with those local rural 
workers who have jobs within their original township but do not migrate out.12 However, 
even in this distorted form we can detect the slow but steady increase of the migrant ratio in 
the construction sector to the detriment of the manufacturing sector throughout 2012 (Table 
                                                        
12 We have comparable data on the sectoral distribution of migrants only for 2009 According to these 
data the share of migrants in manufacturing in 2009 was 39.1% and in the construction share was 
17.3%, both higher than the corresponding shares of nonfarm rural laborers (36.1% and 15.2%, Table 
11). Migrants are probably also more concentrated in manufacturing and construction than nonfarm 
rural laborers in other years.  
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11). This happened despite the fact that the share of non-farm rural laborers in the 
manufacturing sector remained the double of those in the construction sector. 
Table 11.  
Sectoral Distribution of Nonfarm Rural Laborers from 2008-2011 (%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Manufacturing 37.2 36.1 36.7 36.0 35.7 
Construction 13.8 15.2 16.1 17.7 18.4 
Transportation, 
storage & post 
6.4 6.8 6.9 6.6 6.6 
Wholesale & 
retail 
9.0 10.0 10.0 10.1 9.8 
Hotel & catering 5.5 6.0 6.0 5.3 5.2 
Services 12.2 12.7 12.7 12.2 12.2 
Others 15.9 13.2 11.6 12.1 12.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Note: non-farm rural laborers (migrants plus local rural workers). Here migrant stands for rural labor 
that migrates out of their home town and local rural workers stands for those who have jobs within 
their origin township and do not migrate out. 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-20112 
 
The share of employment in manufacturing in 2009 decreased by 1.1 percentage point, 
then slightly increased in 2010 and practically remained stagnant the next two years. The 
growing share of employment of non-farm rural laborers follows the tendency of increasing 
share of construction sector in the GDP.  In 2008 it was 6 percent, increased to 6.6 percent in 
2009 and 2010, and kept rising to 6.8 percent in 2011 and 2012. Given the statistical figures 
of the first half of 2013, the share of construction will be even higher13 Since the majority of 
construction workers are migrants, the growing share of migrants working in construction 
reflected the expanding construction sector. Even after the 2009 and 2010 stimulus package, 
employment in the construction sector shows no sign of shrinking. The stimulus package may 
have triggered the construction “boom” and exert a relative long impact on the sectoral 
distribution of migrants. 
Sectoral distribution of non-farm laborers by region is available only for 2010 and 2011 
(Table 12). It reflects the varied reactions of sectors differentiated by region. The share of 
those working in manufacturing declined in the east, somewhat increased in the central 
region and stagnated in the western region. In turn, in the construction sector employment 
slightly increased in all regions, but the highest increase was in the central region by 2011.  It 
                                                        
13 Data source: construction shares in GDP of 2008-2011 are collected from the China Statistical 
Yearbook 2012 and information of 2012 and first half of 2013 is collected and calculated from 
following NBS web links: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20130221_402874525.htm  
and http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20130715_402911015.htm 
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looks like that both sectoral and regional priorities worked according to the priorities of the 
stimulus package.)  
 
Table 12.  
Sectoral Distribution of Nonfarm Rural Laborers in 2010-2011 by Region (%) 
 All East Center West 
 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
Manufacturing 36.7 36.0 46.2 44.8 22.4 23.0 15.0 15.4 
Construction 16.1 17.7 12.2 13.4 20.5 24.7 26.1 27.4 
Transportation
, storage and 
post 
6.9 6.0 5.8 5.5 8.5 8.1 9.3 9.3 
Wholesale and 
retail 
10.0 10.1 8.6 8.7 13.1 13.1 11.9 12.5 
Hoteling and 
catering 
6.0 5.3 5.0 4.5 7.0 5.9 8.5 7.3 
Services 12.7 12.2 12.1 12.3 13.5 11.4 14.1 12.2 
Others 11.6 12.7 10.1 10.8 15.0 13.8 15.1 15.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Reports 2010 & 2011 
 
Incomes increased steadily in all sectors, supposedly as a result of increased labor 
demand, owing to regional and sectoral preferences of the stimulus package, and market 
reactions to it. Still, the highest incomes in absolute number all over the years and the highest 
growth in 2011 are shown in the transportation and construction sectors (Table 13). 
However,, construction sector preferred by the stimulus package carried the highest risks in 
employment without contract in 2009 presumably owing to the large pool of migrants 
attracted to the construction sector. In 2009, 74 percent of migrants working in the 
construction sector compared to the average 57.2 percent of migrants did not have a contract. 
In manufacturing, this ratio increased in 2010 when investment rate increased and there 
might have been an oversupply. In the same year, in construction this ratio declined when 
investment rate and labor shortage developed both owing to the higher labor demand than 
actual supply caused by accelerated investments in the sector and by the attraction of other 
sectors, including manufacturing. Those with no contract in manufacturing never reached the 
ratio of the same in construction and remained always below the average while in 
construction this ratio was always the highest presumably owing to the high turnover of those 
working in this sector.14 In 2011 those with no contract in manufacturing declined parallel to 
                                                        
14 This fact may be explained also by the special conditions the workers are hired in the construction 
sector. In most cases, the construction companies do not employ any construction worker directly. 
They will find a labor company to provide workers. The labor companies often have connection with 
several laborer dealers. The laborer dealers always have a bunch of construction workers at their order. 
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all other sectors’ no-contract ratio. This tendency evolved presumably owing to the revival of 
manufacturing that was competing for similar educational level migrants as in construction. 
We suppose that by that time also the labor-law criteria temporary suspended in 2009 were 
re-implemented.  
Table 13.  
Average Monthly Income of Migrants by Sector (yuan, based on 2008 prices) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Monthly 
income 
Monthly 
income 
Growth 
% 
NO 
contract 
% 
Monthly 
income 
Growth 
 % 
NO 
contract % 
Monthly 
income 
Growth  
% 
NO  
contract 
% 
Manuf. 1264 1340 6.01 49.3 1542 15.07 52.3 1776 15.18 49.6 
Constr. 1534 1636 6.65 74.0 1897 15.95 70.9 2203 16.13 73.6 
Transp., 
storage  
& post 
1582 1683 6.38 Missing 1907 13.31 Missing 2298 20.50 Missing 
Wholesale  
& retail 
1397 1453 4.01 66.0 1673 15.14 64.7 1872 11.89 60.9 
Hotel  
& catering 
1169 1273 8.90 65.2 1473 15.71 65.7 1671 13.44 64.6 
Services 1219 1285 5.41 63.9 1482 15.33 62.8 1689 13.97 61.4 
Average 1340 1427 6.49 57.2 1648 15.49 58 1895 14.99 56.2 
 
Note: The 2008 figures are derived from 2009 income level and growth rate. 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-2011 
 
Differences in growth pace of wages to the advantage of the prioritized sector might have 
been caused by the regional and sectoral preferences of the stimulus package. Priorities 
brought about faster income increase in the western and central regions in 2009, narrowing 
the so-far prevailing regional migrant income gap (Table 14). This happened despite the fact 
that average monthly income of migrants substantially grew also in the eastern region. This 
latter was presumably forced to compete with the central region’s labor demand that has 
grown the fastest, adapting to regional development. In 2009, one may experience a radical 
increase in incomes compared to the previous year in the west. By 2010 the growth rate of 
real wages at eastern and central regions tripled while in the west doubled. (In nominal terms 
wage growth rate at eastern and central regions quadrupled, while in the west more than 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The workers depend on the dealer to find jobs for them. The labor company will sign formal contracts 
with the dealers about the labor supply and the payment. In the contract, the dealers represent all the 
workers as a collective. But there are often no formal contracts between the dealers and the workers, as 
we see in Table 9. At the end of each construction project, or before the Spring Festival, the labor 
company gets the money from the construction company, that will pay the dealers, and then the 
dealers distribute the money to hired workers. It could a long period between when the workers start 
to work and when they get their money. To cover everyday expense, the workers borrow money from 
the dealers, and the borrowed part will be deducted from total due payment in the final settlement. 
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doubled15). Such radical increase was caused regionally for different reasons: in the east, 
dramatic growth was presumably caused by the developing labor shortage due to the 
deviation of migration routes to the central and western regions. In the central and western 
regions, radical increase might be attributed the labor demand caused by the direct impact of 
the stimulus package. From then on, growth pace of eastern and western provinces did not 
differ spatially, thus the size of income gap between the west and east stabilized. The pace of 
growth at the center remained the fastest throughout 2012, steadily narrowing the income 
gap between the eastern and the central regions.16  
Table 14.  
Average Monthly Income of Migrants and Growth  by Regions  
(based on current and  2008 prices) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
National Level 
(yuan) 
1340 1427 1648 1895 2064 
East 1352 1432 1653 1899 2061 
Center 1275 1360 1591 1855 2035 
West 1273 1388 1602 1841 2007 
Real Growth (%):       
National Level  6.49 15.46 14.99 8.93 
East  5.92 15.46 14.85 8.53 
Center  6.63 17.03 16.62 9.66 
West  9.01 15.42 14.91 9.02 
Nominal Growth 
(%): 
     
All  5.75 19.27 21.24 11.76 
East  5.18 19.27 21.05 11.35 
Center  5.88 20.89 22.92 12.51 
West  8.25 19.23 21.12 11.86 
 
Note: nominal income figures from NBS Migrants Monitoring Reports, adjusted by CPI from NBS 
data to get real income and real growth rate 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-2011 
 
Not only income conditions but also social security conditions improved by 2010 and 
onwards, though still extremely low in every respect (Table 15). The highest coverage was 
experienced in the case of Accident insurance. There was a slight set-back during 2009 crisis 
period in pension, accident and medical insurance coverage. It contributed to this set-back 
that in 2009 the government, responding to the crisis, temporary suspended the 
                                                        
15 The real income growth in 2009 was the fastest also by controlled CPI than in the other three years. 
The major differences between nominal and real income results may be revealed in 2010 and 2011. 
Using nominal income, growth rate in 2011 is higher than that of 2010, but in real terms it will reverse, 
referring to the higher inflation of wages in 2011 compared to 2010. 
16 The relative high income in construction and transportation could be a result of long working hours 
and also act as compensation of intensive work, bad working conditions, no social security and no 
contract security.  If converted to hourly income, the workers in the two sectors may not enjoy such 
income advantages. 
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implementation of the new labor law. From 2010 just as in the case of incomes, security 
coverage increased steadily, incited by the emerging labor demand for migrants in 2010 due 
to the stimulus package.  
Table 15.   
Social Security Coverage by type (%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Pension 9.8 7.6 9.5 13.9 14.3 
Accident 24.1 21.8 24.1 23.6 24.0 
Medical 13.1 12.2 14.3 16.7 16.9 
Unemployment 3.7 3.9 4.9 8.0 8.4 
Maternity 2.0 2.4 2.9 5.6 6.1 
 
Note: summa number of migrants by security type = 100. The figures in the table above are the 
proportion of migrants whose employer provides them with different form of social security. We do 
not have here the ratio of those paying for themselves, or that of those paying shared with the 
employer, neither the ratio of those who do not have those types of security at all. 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-2012 
 
Regarding security coverage data by region (Table 16), the ratio of coverage was and 
remained much lower in both the center and the west than in the east reflecting the 
difference in economic and labor market developments. However, supposedly as a result of 
increased labor demand owing to recuperating export and improving export structure in the 
east, versus the attraction of migrants to the central and western regions and government 
policy, the rapid expansion of social security coverage occurred in all three regions in almost 
all kinds of securities between 2009 and 2012.17 The ratio of those covered with accident 
insurance was the highest among all insurances, while that of maternity the lowest.  Pension 
coverage, though lower in the west and central regions practically doubled everywhere, 
though still being very low: the highest percentage was in the east with 16 percent in 2012. 
The ratio of those covered by unemployment and maternity insurance also doubled during 
the period. Accident insurance also increased in all three regions by 2010, but either 
remained stagnant as in the western and eastern provinces from 2011, or declined as in the 
central region. Similar stagnation may be experienced in all three regions in 2011-2012 after a 
substantial growth by 2010. Growth of the ratio of those covered by different securities in 
                                                        
17 In the largest city with high export ratio and GDP/capita  the competition is for those with higher 
level education. A new regulation coming into effect in 2013 July 1 losened the criteria of the chances 
to receive local hukou for those in higher education. This policy will benefit migrant workers as they 
obtain the 120 points required by having a strong education background or professional skills, or doing 
jobs in fields that are urgently needed by the city enables the applicant to keep allocated farmland back 
in their hometown, while securing urban benefits in Shanghai. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-06/19/c_124880812.htm. At the same time, owing 
to sluggish manufacturing export and rising labor costs, labor demand of small and medium sized 
enterprises declined in the major south east provinces forcing enterprises to decrease labor or even 
close down. 
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2010 is parallel with the increase of the rate of urban workers and migrants as well as the 
gradual recuperation of export/GDP, the increase in the rate of investment in manufacturing 
and presumably the increased labor demand owing to the response of the manufacturing 
sector to input needs of the prioritized construction sector that brought about massive labor 
demand and better job offers in 2010.18 
Table 16.  
Social Security Coverage: by Region, between 2009 and 2012 (%) 
    Pension Accident Medical Unempl. Maternity 
All 
2009 7.6 21.8 12.2 3.9 2.3 
2010 9.5 24.1 14.3 4.9 2.9 
2011 13.9 23.6 16.7 8 5.6 
2012 14.3 24 16.9 8.4 6.1 
East 
2009 8.8 24.6 13.9 4.6 2.8 
2010 10.9 27 16.1 5.7 3.5 
2011 16.4 27 19.3 9.5 6.7 
2012 16.9 27.3 19.6 10 7.3 
Center 
2009 5.2 14.3 8.6 2.6 1.4 
2010 7.1 17.5 10.2 3.6 2.2 
2011 8.3 14.8 10.2 4.8 3.4 
2012 9.2 16.4 10.9 5.3 3.6 
West 
2009 4.2 15.7 7.4 2 1 
2010 5.5 17.5 10 2.9 1.3 
2011 8.3 17 11.1 4.5 2.8 
2012 8.3 17 11.3 4.9 3.2 
 
Note: summa number of migrants by security type = 100% The figures in the table above are the 
proportion of migrants whose employer provides them with different form of social security. We do 
not have here the ratio of those paying for themselves, or that of those paying shared with the 
employer, neither the ratio of those who do not have those types of security at all. 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2011-2012 
 
Besides growing income and expanding social security, working conditions have 
improved also regarding working time (Table 17). We only have national level aggregated 
figures, unfortunately, neither regional nor sectoral differences may be uncovered from 
those. On national level, though the ratio of migrants working more than 5 days and more 
than 44 hours a week and more than 8 hours a day is overwhelming, ratios have visibly 
decreased from 2010 to 2011.  
                                                        
18 Unfortunately we do not have disaggregated data on the regional dispersion of the first and second generation 
of migrants that would explain the higher education and higher demands of these latter responding to the changes 
in export structure. 
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Table 17. 
 Average Working Time of Migrants 
 2009 2010 2011 
Months per year  9.8 9.8 
Days for Month 26 26.2 25.4 
Hours per day 58.4h/week: 8.9 9.0 8.8 
Proportion of migrants who 
work more than 5 days a week 
 86.4 83.5 
Proportion of migrants who 
work more than 8 hours a day 
 49.3 42.4 
Proportion of migrants who 
work more than 44 hours a 
week 
89.8 90.7 84.5 
 
Note: (No completely comparable working time information for 2009 and none for 2008) 8.9 = 26 
days per month/4 weeks= 6.5 days per week, 58.4/6.5= 8.9 
Source: NBS, China Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-2011 
Crisis and economic development had an interesting impact on non-farm laborers and 
within those on migrants and their new generation. There is a radical improvement of 
education level among nonfarm laborers in 2011 in general, both compared to returning 
migrants in 2008 (more than double) and to the educational level of the new generation 
(Table 18).19  Compared to this latter, the share of higher education among returned migrants 
was one third of that of the new generation. 
Table 18.  
Education Level of Nonfarm Rural Laborers 2011 (%) 
 
Nonfarm 
Rural 
Laborers 
Local 
Nonfarm 
Laborers 
Migrants New 
generation 
Migrants 
Returning 
in 2008 
2009 2011 
Illiterate 1.5 2.1 2.4 1.1 0.9 0.3 
Primary school 14.4 18.4 14.8 10.6 10.7 5.9 
Middle School 61.1 59.0 65.8 64.8 62.9 59.8 
High School 13.2 13.9 11.1 13.1 12.7 14.5 
Technical 
secondary school 
4.5 3.2 4.0 
10.4 
5.8 8.6 
Tertiary and higher 
education  
5.3 3.4 2.0 7.0 10.9 
Note: In 2009, education level of migrants does not separate Technical secondary school and Tertiary 
education and higher. The sum of these to level is 10.4 
Source: NBS, 2008 Migrant survey, NBS, Migrants Monitoring Report 2009 and 2011 
                                                        
19 Presumably sharp disparities stand behind the average data according to migration destinations and 
local development specifics, or the situation changed since the report of a survey carried out in 2006-
2007  in  in Guangzhou City and Bozhou rural areas. The primary migration motivation and reasons 
for migrants to relocate or change jobs.  New generation interviewed in this survey did not migrate for 
work, did not remit money home, was tired from school, did not have longer-term purposes but to 
amuse themselves (Hu, 2012). Hu’s conclusions are opposite that of Chiang at al.( 2013)carried out 4 
times between 2000 and 2009 about young generation in Gansu city. This survey suggest, that besides 
non-economic goals at both young woman and man they are also motivated by altruistic economic 
reasons for the sake of the family.  
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Meanwhile nonfarm rural workers’ average age rose from 34 to 36. Age structure tended 
towards the increase of the ratio of those above 40 years from 30.0 percent in 2008 to 40.7 
percent  in 2012 (Table 19). Several explanations are possible: either the number of nonfarm 
rural laborers increased owing to increased labor demand and shortage of younger 
generation.  
Table 19.  
Age Structure of Nonfarm Rural Labor (%) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
16-20 10.7 8.5 6.5 6.3 4.9 
21-30 35.3 35.8 35.9 32.7 31.9 
31-40 24.0 23.6 23.5 22.7 22.5 
41-50 18.6 19.9 21.2 24.0 25.6 
50+ 11.4 12.2 12.9 14.3 15.1 
Source: China’s Migrants Monitoring Report 2009-2012 
Increasing proportion of older generation suggests that new generation among migrants 
is increasingly scarce. New entrants educational structure improved, presumably increasing 
their wages in the labor market and contributing to the demand of more advanced production 
and export structure. 
CONCLUSION 
We have traced the impact of global crisis and the priorities of the stimulus package 
introduced in late 2008 on the characteristics of migrant flow in China. Our hypothesis was 
based on macro-level and regional level economic data. GDP and export data demonstrated 
substantial set-back in the 2008-2009 period and recuperation in the years after, while 
investment data reflected the impact of the stimulus package from 2009 onwards. Sectoral 
priorities of the stimulus package were revealed in the higher growth pace of the construction 
sector in 2009 compared to the crisis hit manufacturing.  Regional level investment, credit 
and output growth compared to pre-crisis period demonstrated strong regional deviation or 
reinforced tendencies from the east towards the central and western regions according to 
regional priorities of the stimulus package. Also regional-sectoral investment growth in 
manufacturing and construction testified for the fulfillment of sectoral and regional priorities 
of the stimulus package. Regional level output by state owned enterprises and private 
enterprises show the prompt reaction of the market to input demands of the prioritized state 
owned sphere in both manufacturing and construction sectors. Our hypothesis based on the 
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above dynamics was that migrant flow would react sensitively to the crisis and to the sectoral, 
regional priorities of the stimulus package. 
Results show that sensitivity to crisis and to the stimulus package priorities, though 
sectorally similar, is higher at migrant data than regarding general employment data. The 
crisis caused a temporary but dramatic set-back in migrant employment while the booming 
investments incited by the stimulus package increased labor demand well above the pre-crisis 
period. On the one hand, temporary set-back in migrant flow had regional character owing to 
coastal concentration of exports. On the other hand, stimulus package did restructure 
migrant routes of the pre-crisis period according to its regional and sectoral priorities. The 
regional priorities of the stimulus package reinforced the redirection of migrants away from 
the coast though keeping the east’s majority share. Restructuring occurred also by the fact, 
that migrants in all regions increasingly chose to remain in their hukou province rather than 
migrating out of it. Thus, regional shift in migrant flow has shortened the distance of 
migration routes and destination both regionally and within provinces. Regional shift also 
incited radical overall wage growth and the narrowing of the wage gap among regions. 
Also sectoral impact of the stimulus package on migration was revealed. The number of 
migrants decreased in manufacturing and increased in the prioritized construction. Labor 
demand and restructuring went parallel to decreasing income disparities among migrants not 
only regionally but also sectorally. Narrowing gap occurred, not only in the volume of wages 
but also in the increase of social securiy coverage, the decline of the ratio of those workers 
with no labor contract (though being the higherst in the construction sector) and the decrease 
of working hours. Based on indirect indicators we also suppose that that these developments 
were also influenced by the restructuring of industrial production and export during this 
period that requires higher skills and higher wages and develops labor shortage in this field. 
This is supposed to be reflected in the decreasing ratio of illiterates and that of those finishing 
primary and middle school to the advantage of those who ackquired high school, technical 
secondary school and higher education. This supposition is reinforced by parallel shift in age 
structure towards older migrant generation that increases new generation value. 
Characteristics of migrant flow show several persistent features that may prove to be later 
temporary as migrants adapt to the dynamics of the impact of the stimulus package or or to a 
new stimulus with different sectoral and regional priorities. Signs of temporary character of 
so-far tendencies may be also detected: mobilization of the manufacturing sector as a 
reaction to prioritized input demands is attracting further migrant growth, and so do the 
reactions of the private sector, the growing labor demand of slowly recuperating export and 
new investments at coastal region. 
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